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District attorney compensation and performance

Author

Listed:
  • DeAngelo, Gregory
  • McCannon, Bryan C.
  • Stockham, Morgan

Abstract

We attempt to identify the causal effect of wages on a prosecutor’s effort by studying an exogenous salary increase in New York. We measure the performance by the likelihood that a conviction is upheld when appealed. If the efficiency wage theory explains behavior, then the exogenous wage shock should entice better performance. Alternatively, if individuals who hold office are motivated primarily by an intrinsic motivations rather than strictly financial compensation, then their performance would be unrelated to changes in their salary. We mostly find, inconsistent with efficiency wage theory, that a pay increase has a null effect on prosecutor performance.

Suggested Citation

  • DeAngelo, Gregory & McCannon, Bryan C. & Stockham, Morgan, 2023. "District attorney compensation and performance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:73:y:2023:i:c:s0144818822000588
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2022.106102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bryan C. McCannon, 2021. "Informational value of challenging an incumbent prosecutor," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(2), pages 568-586, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Appeal; Compensation; Conviction; Prosecutor;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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