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On the wrong side of the law – Causes and consequences of a corrupt judiciary

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  • Voigt, Stefan
  • Gutmann, Jerg

Abstract

Empirical research on the determinants of corruption has made substantial progress over the last decade. To date, the consequences of different structures of the legal enforcement institutions have, however, only played a marginal role. This contribution deals with both the determinants of corruption in the judiciary and the consequences of judicial organization for corruption at large. Regarding the latter, it is shown that the actual independence of the judiciary as well as that of prosecution agencies is correlated with lower levels of corruption. This is also true for a third indicator that measures the degree to which judges are held accountable for their decisions (“judicial accountability”). Furthermore, independence and accountability function as complements in preventing corruption – judicial accountability without independence appears to be ineffective, whereas judicial or prosecutorial independence alone can even have adverse effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg, 2015. "On the wrong side of the law – Causes and consequences of a corrupt judiciary," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 156-166.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:156-166
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.005
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    13. Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, 2007. "Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 65-92, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2017. "Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 346-372, December.
    2. Jerg Gutmann & Viola Lucas, 2018. "Private-Sector Corruption: Measurement and Cultural Origins," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 138(2), pages 747-770, July.
    3. Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2020. "Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality: Unfair procedures may benefit the worst-off," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 341-354.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Judiciary; Judicial independence; Prosecutorial independence; Judicial accountability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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