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Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors

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  • Boylan, Richard T
  • Long, Cheryl X

Abstract

We examine the relation between local labor markets and the behavior of federal prosecutors. Empirical evidence is provided that assistant U.S. attorneys in districts with high private salaries are more likely to take cases to trial than are assistants in districts with low private salaries. We explain this finding as follows. In high-salary districts, government salaries are not competitive relative to the private sector. Therefore, federal prosecutor positions are sought by individuals who want the trial experience needed to secure desired private-sector employment. The following additional evidence further supports this explanation. First, the turnover of assistant U.S. attorneys is higher in highprivate-salary districts than in low-private-salary districts. Second, individuals who leave their employment as assistant U.S. attorneys are of higher quality in districts with higher private-lawyer salaries. Third, assistant U.S. attorneys with more trial experience are more likely to take positions in large private law firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Boylan, Richard T & Long, Cheryl X, 2005. "Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 627-651, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2005:v:48:i:2:p:627-51
    DOI: 10.1086/429854
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2017. "Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 346-372, December.
    2. Mongrain, Steeve & Roberts, Joanne, 2009. "Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 8-12, March.
    3. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2014. "Queuing Up For Justice: Elections and Case Backlogs," Discussion Papers 14-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    4. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
    5. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    6. S. Avdasheva & S. Golovanova & Y. Katsoulacos, 2019. "Optimal Institutional Structure of Competition Authorities Under Reputation Maximization: A Model and Empirical Evidence from the Case of Russia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 251-282, March.
    7. Richard T. Boylan, 2012. "The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 565-591.
    8. Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.
    9. Samantha Bielen & Peter Grajzl, 2021. "Prosecution or Persecution? Extraneous Events and Prosecutorial Decisions," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(4), pages 765-800, December.
    10. Andrew F. Daughety & Reinganum F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00005, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    11. Crystal S. Yang, 2016. "Resource Constraints and the Criminal Justice System: Evidence from Judicial Vacancies," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 289-332, November.
    12. Bryan C. McCannon, 2021. "Informational value of challenging an incumbent prosecutor," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(2), pages 568-586, October.
    13. Christmann, Robin, 2018. "Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight Bias in Adversary Legal Systems," MPRA Paper 84870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Engel, Christoph & Reuben, Alicja, 2015. "The people's hired guns? Experimentally testing the motivating force of a legal frame," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 67-82.
    15. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan McCannon, 2014. "The effect of the election of prosecutors on criminal trials," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 141-156, October.
    16. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.
    17. Bryan C. McCannon, 2013. "Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 696-714, December.
    18. Shana M. Judge & Jenna L. Dole, 2022. "Charging sex traffickers under federal law: What dispositions should we expect when applying theories on prosecutorial decision‐making?," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 677-715, September.
    19. Alexander Whalley, 2013. "Elected versus Appointed Policy Makers: Evidence from City Treasurers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 39-81.
    20. Libman Alexander & Schultz André & Graeber Thomas, 2016. "Tax Return as a Political Statement," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 377-445, July.
    21. Shamir Noam & Shamir Julia, 2012. "The Role of Prosecutor's Incentives in Creating Congestion in Criminal Courts," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 579-618, December.
    22. DeAngelo, Gregory & McCannon, Bryan C. & Stockham, Morgan, 2023. "District attorney compensation and performance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    23. repec:clg:wpaper:2009-05 is not listed on IDEAS

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