On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2013-01-07 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-01-07 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-01-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-01-07 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-01-07 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-01-07 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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