Egalitarianism. An evolutionary perspective
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2013-06-24 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-06-24 (Game Theory)
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