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What Ought to Be if “There Ought to Be a Law”

Author

Listed:
  • Art Carden

    (Samford University and American Institute for Economic Research)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Art Carden, 2024. "What Ought to Be if “There Ought to Be a Law”," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 39(Fall 2024), pages 79-89.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:2038
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, 2008. "Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-Events?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 5(3), pages 294-315, September.
    2. McCloskey, Deirdre Nansen, 2006. "The Bourgeois Virtues," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226556635, December.
    3. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995. "The Economic Case against Drug Prohibition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    James M. Buchanan; “The Constitution of Economic Policy”; Steven G. Horwitz; “Ought Implies Can”;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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