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Dynastic cycle: a generic structure describing resource allocation in political economies, markets and firms

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  • K Saeed

    (WPI)

  • O V Pavlov

    (WPI)

Abstract

A generic system embodies basic principles and insights that are common to a set of diverse cases and situations. This paper presents a new generic system that we name the dynastic cycle structure. It is based on a stylized model of events from the Chinese history. The model describes resource allocation between social, asocial and control uses in political economies, markets and firms that experience cyclical behaviour and homeostasis symbolizing low levels of performance. Numerical simulations with the model are used to understand the internal dynamics and to test several policy scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • K Saeed & O V Pavlov, 2008. "Dynastic cycle: a generic structure describing resource allocation in political economies, markets and firms," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 59(10), pages 1289-1298, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:59:y:2008:i:10:d:10.1057_palgrave.jors.2602456
    DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602456
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miron, Jeffrey A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1991. "Alcohol Consumption during Prohibition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 242-247, May.
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    6. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995. "The Economic Case against Drug Prohibition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oleg V. Pavlov & Jason M. Sardell, 2023. "Economic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: A Simulation Feedback Model," Papers 2304.07975, arXiv.org.
    2. Khalid Saeed, 2014. "Jay Forrester's operational approach to economics," System Dynamics Review, System Dynamics Society, vol. 30(4), pages 233-261, October.

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