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The Explanation of Social Conventions by Melioration Learning

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Abstract

In line with previous research, the evolution of social conventions is explored by n-way coordination games. A convention is said to be established if decisions of all actors synchronise over time. In contrast to the earlier studies, an empirically well-grounded process of reinforcement learning is used as behavioural assumption. The model is called melioration learning. It is shown by agent-based simulations that melioration enables actors to establish a convention. Besides the payoffs of the coordination game, the network structure of interactions affects actors' ability to coordinate their choices and the speed of convergence. The results of melioration learning are compared to predictions of the Roth-Erev model.

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  • Johannes Zschache, 2017. "The Explanation of Social Conventions by Melioration Learning," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(3), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2016-85-3
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    1. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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    4. Antonides, Gerrit & Maital, Shlomo, 2002. "Effects of feedback and educational training on maximization in choice tasks: experimental-game evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 155-165.
    5. Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
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