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Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries

Author

Listed:
  • Lucas Ronconi

    (Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social (CIAS), Argentina, and IZA, Germany)

Abstract

More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucas Ronconi, 2019. "Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 457-457, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:2019:n:457
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucas Ronconi, 2010. "Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations in Argentina," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(4), pages 719-736, July.
    2. Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
    3. Freeman, Richard B., 2010. "Labor Regulations, Unions, and Social Protection in Developing Countries," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4657-4702, Elsevier.
    4. Rita Almeida & Pedro Carneiro, 2012. "Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 64-89, July.
    5. Ronconi, Lucas & Zarazaga S.J., Rodrigo, 2015. "Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 453-461.
    6. Ravi KANBUR & Lucas RONCONI, 2018. "Enforcement matters: The effective regulation of labour," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 157(3), pages 331-356, September.
    7. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293323.
    8. Almeida, Rita K. & Poole, Jennifer P., 2017. "Trade and labor reallocation with heterogeneous enforcement of labor regulations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 154-166.
    9. Vladimir Gimpelson & Rostislav Kapelyushnikov & Anna Lukyanova, 2010. "Employment Protection Legislation in Russia: Regional Enforcement and Labor Market Outcomes," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 52(4), pages 611-636, December.
    10. Matthew Amengual, 2014. "Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages with Society in Argentina," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 67(1), pages 3-33, January.
    11. Roberto PIRES, 2008. "Promoting sustainable compliance: Styles of labour inspection and compliance outcomes in Brazil," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 147(2-3), pages 199-229, June.
    12. Ronconi, Lucas & Zarazaga S.J., Rodrigo, 2015. "Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 453-461.
    13. T. H. Gindling & Nadwa Mossaad & Juan Diego Trejos, 2015. "The Consequences of Increased Enforcement of Legal Minimum Wages in a Developing Country," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 68(3), pages 666-707, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gindling, T. H. & Ronconi, Lucas, 2023. "Minimum Wage Policy and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12931, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Ronconi, Lucas & Kanbur, Ravi & López-Cariboni, Santiago, 2019. "Who Demands Labour (De)Regulation in the Developing World? Insider–Outsider Theory Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 12831, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Alejandro Estefan & Roberto Gerhard & Joseph P. Kaboski & Illenin O. Kondo & Wei Qian, 2024. "Outsourcing Policy and Worker Outcomes: Causal Evidence from a Mexican Ban," Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers 084, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    4. María J. Angulo-Guerrero & Elena Bárcena-Martín & Samuel Medina-Claros & Salvador Pérez-Moreno, 2024. "Labor market regulation and gendered entrepreneurship: a cross-national perspective," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 687-706, February.
    5. Duman, Anil, 2024. "The Diversity of Informal Employment: a survey of drivers, outcomes, and policies," OSF Preprints yg3t7, Center for Open Science.
    6. Kanbur, Ravi & Ronconi, Lucas & López-Cariboni, Santiago, 2020. "Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world? Insider–outsider theory revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers 14277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Dewey, Matías & Ronconi, Lucas, 2023. "Weberian Civil Service and Labor Enforcement," IZA Discussion Papers 16295, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-employment; poverty; labor earnings;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • J46 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Informal Labor Market

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