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The Effects of Time Pressure on Quality in Software Development: An Agency Model

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  • Robert D. Austin

    (Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field, Boston, Massachusetts 02163)

Abstract

An agency framework is used to model the behavior of software developers as they weigh concerns about product quality against concerns about missing individual task deadlines. Developers who care about quality but fear the career impact of missed deadlines may take “shortcuts.” Managers sometimes attempt to reduce this risk via their deadline-setting policies; a common method involves adding slack to best estimates when setting deadlines to partially alleviate the time pressures believed to encourage shortcut-taking. This paper derives a formal relationship between deadline-setting policies and software product quality. It shows that: (1) adding slack does not always preserve quality, thus, systematically adding slack is an incomplete policy for minimizing costs; (2) costs can be minimized by adopting policies that permit estimates of completion dates and deadlines that are different and; (3) contrary to casual intuition, shortcut-taking can be eliminated by setting deadlines aggressively, thereby maintaining or even increasing the time pressures under which developers work.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert D. Austin, 2001. "The Effects of Time Pressure on Quality in Software Development: An Agency Model," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 195-207, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orisre:v:12:y:2001:i:2:p:195-207
    DOI: 10.1287/isre.12.2.195.9699
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Natalia Levina, 2005. "Collaborating on Multiparty Information Systems Development Projects: A Collective Reflection-in-Action View," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 109-130, June.
    4. von Krogh, Georg & von Hippel, Eric, 2003. "Special issue on open source software development," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1149-1157, July.
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    6. Craig W. Fisher & InduShobha Chengalur-Smith & Donald P. Ballou, 2003. "The Impact of Experience and Time on the Use of Data Quality Information in Decision Making," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 170-188, June.
    7. Narayan Ramasubbu & Chris F. Kemerer, 2016. "Technical Debt and the Reliability of Enterprise Software Systems: A Competing Risks Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1487-1510, May.
    8. Raheleh Hassannia & Ali Vatankhah Barenji & Zhi Li & Habib Alipour, 2019. "Web-Based Recommendation System for Smart Tourism: Multiagent Technology," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-18, January.
    9. Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, 2003. "Open Source Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 209-223, April.

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