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Regulación de las tarifas de acceso a las redes y liberalización del sector eléctrico español

Author

Listed:
  • José Ignacio Sánchez-Macías

    (Universidad de Salamanca)

  • Pedro Calero Pérez

    (Universidad de Salamanca)

Abstract

El Real Decreto 1164/2001 regula con carácter general las tarifas de acceso a las redes de transporte y distribución de energía eléctrica por parte de terceros, estableciendo un sistema uniforme. Un modelo económico estilizado permite ilustrar que con este sistema se establecen subsidios cruzados implícitos que, además de ser más ineficientes que los subsidios explícitos, pueden enmascarar señales informativas de inversión en generación y ampliación de redes de transporte. Después de comparar la opción escogida por el regulador español con otras alternativas propuestas en la literatura, en el trabajo se muestra cómo con la vigente estructura de peajes y con los precios actuales del pool, no parece previsible que se vaya a producir en el segmento de consumidores de baja tensión un volumen importante de transacciones en el mercado, al menos en el corto plazo. Classification-JEL : L51, L94, L98.

Suggested Citation

  • José Ignacio Sánchez-Macías & Pedro Calero Pérez, 2003. "Regulación de las tarifas de acceso a las redes y liberalización del sector eléctrico español," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 166(3), pages 61-83, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2003:v:166:i:3:p:61-83
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chisari, Omar O. & Dal-Bo, Pedro & Romero, Carlos A., 2001. "High-tension electricity network expansions in Argentina: decision mechanisms and willingness-to-pay revelation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 697-715, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Perez, Yannick & Ramos Real, Francisco Javier, 2008. "How to make a European integrated market in small and isolated electricity systems? The case of the Canary Islands," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 4159-4167, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    . Regulación; tarifas eléctricas; electricidad; tarifas de acceso; peajes de redes.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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