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Sustainable Governance for the Opened Electric Vehicle Charging and Upgraded Facilities Market

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  • Tian Wu

    (Academy of Mathematics and Systems Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
    School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
    Key Laboratory of Big Data Mining and Knowledge Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China)

  • Bohan Zeng

    (School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

  • Yali He

    (School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

  • Xin Tian

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
    Key Laboratory of Big Data Mining and Knowledge Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
    Research Center on Fictitious Economy and Data Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China)

  • Xunmin Ou

    (Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
    China Automotive Energy Research Center, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

Abstract

Since the China State Grid opened the market for infrastructure construction of electric charging stations and allowed Tesla, Potevio, BAIC BJEV and other enterprises to provide their own charging stations and other infrastructure construction, the development of electric vehicles has been greatly affected. How to maintain a sustainable governance in the opened electric vehicle charging and upgraded facilities market is an important policy issues. This paper presents a monopolistic competition model for the differentiated products market and addresses several issues related to Cournot equilibrium to illustrate why the expected free market actually operates in a monopolistic competition market structure. The analytic solution of the model shows that whether the extent of firm entry is insufficient, excessive or optimum is determined by consumers’ time preference, level of production differentiation and features of cost structure, including fixed cost and marginal cost. The sensitivity analysis has been performed among the above factors and tracked some other factors which would determine the effect of the new policy issues. The main policy suggestion is that the government should optimize entry regulations and lay down the criterion of charging interface standards for charging stations to avoid the electric vehicle charging and upgraded facilities marketization process of a one-size-fits-all solution and form a monopolistic competition market.

Suggested Citation

  • Tian Wu & Bohan Zeng & Yali He & Xin Tian & Xunmin Ou, 2017. "Sustainable Governance for the Opened Electric Vehicle Charging and Upgraded Facilities Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-22, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:9:y:2017:i:11:p:2126-:d:119408
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Shaohua Cui & Hui Zhao & Cuiping Zhang, 2018. "Multiple Types of Plug-In Charging Facilities’ Location-Routing Problem with Time Windows for Mobile Charging Vehicles," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-26, August.
    2. Fangcheng Tang & Zeqiang Qian, 2020. "Leveraging interdependencies among platform and complementors in innovation ecosystem," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(10), pages 1-20, October.
    3. Lin Ma & Yuefan Zhai & Tian Wu, 2019. "Operating Charging Infrastructure in China to Achieve Sustainable Transportation: The Choice between Company-Owned and Franchised Structures," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-22, March.

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