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Vehicle-to-Vehicle Energy Trading Framework: A Systematic Literature Review

Author

Listed:
  • Yiming Xu

    (School of Water, Energy and Environment, Cranfield University, Bedford MK43 0AL, UK)

  • Ali Alderete Peralta

    (School of Water, Energy and Environment, Cranfield University, Bedford MK43 0AL, UK)

  • Nazmiye Balta-Ozkan

    (School of Water, Energy and Environment, Cranfield University, Bedford MK43 0AL, UK)

Abstract

As transportation evolves with greater adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) energy trading stands out as an important innovation for managing energy resources more effectively as it reduces dependency on traditional energy infrastructures and, hence, alleviates the pressure on the power grid during peak demand times. Thus, this paper conducts a systematic review of the V2V energy trading frameworks. Through the included article analysis ( n = 61), this paper discusses the state-of-the-art energy trading frameworks’ structure, employed methodologies, encountered challenges, and potential directions for future research. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first review explicitly focused on V2V energy trading. We detail four critical challenges to face while establishing the framework in current research, providing an overview of various methodologies, including auctions, blockchain, game theory, optimisation, and demand forecasting, that are used to address these challenges and explore their integration within the research landscape. Additionally, this paper forecasts the evolution of V2V energy trading, highlighting the potential incorporation of advanced and established technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), digital twins, and smart contracts. This review aims to encapsulate the existing state of V2V energy trading research and stimulate future advancements and technological integration within the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Yiming Xu & Ali Alderete Peralta & Nazmiye Balta-Ozkan, 2024. "Vehicle-to-Vehicle Energy Trading Framework: A Systematic Literature Review," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(12), pages 1-28, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:12:p:5020-:d:1413560
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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