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Sustainable Growth and Token Economy Design: The Case of Steemit

Author

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  • Moon Soo Kim

    (Department of Crypto MBA, Seoul School of Integrated Sciences & Technologies (aSSIST), Seoul 03767, Korea)

  • Jee Yong Chung

    (Department of Business Administration, Duksung Women’s University, Seoul 01369, Korea)

Abstract

Cryptocurrency blockchain technology is attracting worldwide attention, and the number of initial coin offerings (ICOs) is increasing rapidly. This new economic trend, called cryptoeconomics, can program human behavior through incentive design. A cryptocurrency-based incentive system is not only transparent, but also allows businesses to substitute initial investment costs with cryptocurrency tokens until they are on a sustainable growth trajectory in terms of network effects. This study aims to propose a process for building a desirable model of a token economy, based on the case of Steemit—a blogging and social networking website that is creating high values due to its efficient token economy model. We suggest the following design process of a token economy model: (1) Determine token-business fit, (2) determine the chance of success, (3) determine the properties of token, (4) give tokens intrinsic value, (5) establish strategies to raise token value, (6) establish operational strategies of token economy system, (7) establish strategies for token liquidation, and (8) continue modifying the operational base. Considering cryptoeconomics is still at an early stage, it is expected that the guidelines on the token economy model suggested in this paper will lay a significant foundation for the development of cryptoeconomics research.

Suggested Citation

  • Moon Soo Kim & Jee Yong Chung, 2018. "Sustainable Growth and Token Economy Design: The Case of Steemit," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2018:i:1:p:167-:d:194050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zbigniew Kurylek, 2020. "ICO Tokens as an Alternative Financial Instrument: A Risk Measurement," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 512-530.
    2. Xin Yan & Min Chen & Mu-Yen Chen, 2019. "Coupling and Coordination Development of Australian Energy, Economy, and Ecological Environment Systems from 2007 to 2016," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(23), pages 1-13, November.
    3. Scott Thiebes & Sebastian Lins & Ali Sunyaev, 2021. "Trustworthy artificial intelligence," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 31(2), pages 447-464, June.
    4. Kyungmoo Heo & Sangyoon Yi, 2023. "(De)centralization in the governance of blockchain systems: cryptocurrency cases," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 12(3), pages 59-82, September.
    5. Adele Parmentola & Antonella Petrillo & Ilaria Tutore & Fabio De Felice, 2022. "Is blockchain able to enhance environmental sustainability? A systematic review and research agenda from the perspective of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 194-217, January.

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