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Optimal Regulatory Pricing Under Asymmetric Cost Information

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  • Wayne Y. Lee
  • Anjan V. Thakor

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  • Wayne Y. Lee & Anjan V. Thakor, 1982. "Optimal Regulatory Pricing Under Asymmetric Cost Information," Discussion Papers 580, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:580
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hayne E. Leland, 1974. "Regulation of Natural Monopolies and the Fair Rate of Return," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(1), pages 3-15, Spring.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Spence, Michael, 1974. "Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 296-332, March.
    4. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, 1977. "Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
    5. Leon Courville, 1974. "Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(1), pages 53-74, Spring.
    6. Baron, David P. & De Bondt, Raymond R., 1981. "On the design of regulatory price adjustment mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 70-94, February.
    7. Weitzman, Martin L, 1978. "Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 683-691, September.
    8. W.W. Sharkey, 1982. "Suggestions for a Game-Theoretic Approach to Public Utility Pricing and Cost Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 57-68, Spring.
    9. R. Blaine Roberts & G.S. Maddala & Gregory Enholm, 1978. "Determinants of the Requested Rate of Return and the Rate of Return Granted in a Formal Regulatory Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 611-621, Autumn.
    10. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    11. Baron, David P & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1980. "The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1115-1138, December.
    12. Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, 1982. "Consistent Regulatory Policy under Uncertainty," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 506-521, Autumn.
    13. Baron, D. P. & Holmström, B. R., 1980. "Abstract: The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 851-851, November.
    14. Taggart, Robert A, Jr, 1981. "Rate-of-Return Regulation and Utility Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 383-393, May.
    15. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    16. Baumol, William J & Bailey, Elizabeth E & Willig, Robert D, 1977. "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 350-365, June.
    17. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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