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A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios

Author

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  • Kathryn Merrick

    (School of Engineering and Information Technology, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Canberra, Northcott Drive, Canberra 2600, Australia)

  • Medria Hardhienata

    (School of Engineering and Information Technology, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Canberra, Northcott Drive, Canberra 2600, Australia)

  • Kamran Shafi

    (School of Engineering and Information Technology, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Canberra, Northcott Drive, Canberra 2600, Australia)

  • Jiankun Hu

    (School of Engineering and Information Technology, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Canberra, Northcott Drive, Canberra 2600, Australia)

Abstract

Our increasing dependence on information technologies and autonomous systems has escalated international concern for information- and cyber-security in the face of politically, socially and religiously motivated cyber-attacks. Information warfare tactics that interfere with the flow of information can challenge the survival of individuals and groups. It is increasingly important that both humans and machines can make decisions that ensure the trustworthiness of information, communication and autonomous systems. Subsequently, an important research direction is concerned with modelling decision-making processes. One approach to this involves modelling decision-making scenarios as games using game theory. This paper presents a survey of information warfare literature, with the purpose of identifying games that model different types of information warfare operations. Our contribution is a systematic identification and classification of information warfare games, as a basis for modelling decision-making by humans and machines in such scenarios. We also present a taxonomy of games that map to information warfare and cyber crime problems as a precursor to future research on decision-making in such scenarios. We identify and discuss open research questions including the role of behavioural game theory in modelling human decision making and the role of machine decision-making in information warfare scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Kathryn Merrick & Medria Hardhienata & Kamran Shafi & Jiankun Hu, 2016. "A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-29, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jftint:v:8:y:2016:i:3:p:34-:d:74555
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yang Li & Leyi Shi & Haijie Feng, 2019. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Distributed Honeypots," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-19, March.
    2. Stefania Collodi & Maria Fiorenza & Andrea Guazzini & Mirko Duradoni, 2020. "How Reputation Systems Change the Psychological Antecedents of Fairness in Virtual Environments," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-17, August.
    3. Yufei Wang & Mangirdas Morkūnas & Jinzhao Wei, 2024. "Strategic Synergies: Unveiling the Interplay of Game Theory and Cultural Dynamics in a Globalized World," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-25, June.
    4. Alessandro Fedele & Cristian Roner, 2022. "Dangerous games: A literature review on cybersecurity investments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 157-187, February.

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