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Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

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  • Echenique, Federico
  • Edlin, Aaron S.

Abstract

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Echenique, Federico & Edlin, Aaron S., 2004. "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1ht651hk, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt1ht651hk
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    References listed on IDEAS

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