IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jecomi/v8y2019i1p2-d302591.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regime Type, Issue Type and Economic Sanctions: The Role of Domestic Players

Author

Listed:
  • Mehmet Onder

    (Political Science Department, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202, USA)

Abstract

This analysis highlights the significant role that domestic actors play in determining the outcomes of economic sanctions. It models the behavior of the main opposition party during an economic sanction episode, and introduces two commonly used variables when considering the effectiveness of economic sanctions—regime type and issue type—from a different perspective. Using Bayesian probabilities and a two-stage game-theoretic approach, the analysis finds that states are more likely to impose economic sanctions related to security issues rather than to nonsecurity issues. The tendency to impose sanctions to coerce action on security-related issues is higher when opposition parties in the sanctioning state object to the sanctions. The findings demonstrate that sanctions are more effective when they are supported by the opposition in sender states, as well as target states. Consistent with the literature, this analysis finds that sanctions are more effective when they are targeted against democracies. The game results indicate that sanctions are more successful when they relate to security issues. This paper supplies policymakers with a simple criterion for economic sanctions successs comprised of the support of the opposition within the sender state, that the issue should be of high stakes, and there is support for the economic sanctions from a viable opposition within the target state.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehmet Onder, 2019. "Regime Type, Issue Type and Economic Sanctions: The Role of Domestic Players," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jecomi:v:8:y:2019:i:1:p:2-:d:302591
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/8/1/2/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/8/1/2/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    2. Dursun Peksen, 2019. "Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 253-268, April.
    3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith & Randolph M. Siverson & James D. Morrow, 2005. "The Logic of Political Survival," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524406, April.
    4. Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury, 2010. "Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(3), pages 240-264, August.
    5. Dursun Peksen, 2009. "Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 46(1), pages 59-77, January.
    6. Solomon Major, 2012. "Timing Is Everything: Economic Sanctions, Regime Type, and Domestic Instability," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(1), pages 79-110, January.
    7. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & William Mertens, 2004. "International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 29-51, March.
    8. Susan Hannah Allen, 2005. "The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 117-138, March.
    9. Jones, Lee, 2015. "Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198749325.
    10. Wright, Joseph & Escribà-Folch, Abel, 2012. "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 283-309, April.
    11. Daniel McCormack & Henry Pascoe, 2017. "Sanctions and Preventive War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(8), pages 1711-1739, September.
    12. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
    13. Susan Hannah Allen, 2008. "The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(6), pages 916-944, December.
    14. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2019. "Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 191-215, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy & Lidiya V. Zhukovskaya, 2023. "On the Concept of Equilibrium in Sanctions and Countersanctions in a Differential Game," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(20), pages 1-22, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2020. "Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 161-182, October.
    2. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    3. Attia, Hana & Grauvogel, Julia & von Soest, Christian, 2020. "The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    4. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2024. "Political Economy of International Sanctions," Research Papers in Economics 2024-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    5. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2019. "Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 191-215, September.
    6. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2015. "The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 110-125.
    7. Portela, Clara & Mora-Sanguinetti, Juan S., 2023. "Sanctions effectiveness, development and regime type. Are aid suspensions and economic sanctions alike?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    8. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, October.
    9. von Soest, Christian & Wahman, Michael, 2013. "Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era," GIGA Working Papers 212, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    10. Peeva, Aleksandra, 2019. "Did sanctions help Putin?," Discussion Papers 2019/7, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    11. Mikhail A Alexseev & Henry E Hale, 2020. "Crimea come what may: Do economic sanctions backfire politically?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(2), pages 344-359, March.
    12. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2009. "Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13518.
    13. Tomas Sjostrom, 2023. "Optimal Compellance," Departmental Working Papers 202302, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    14. David Lektzian & Mark Souva, 2007. "An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(6), pages 848-871, December.
    15. Mirkina, Irina, 2018. "FDI and sanctions: An empirical analysis of short- and long-run effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 198-225.
    16. Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus, 2016. "Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea," MPRA Paper 105812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Urtuzuastigui, Jerry & Koren, Ore, 2024. "Targeted sanctions, resource substitution, and violence against civilians: Localized evidence from African states," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    18. Dizaji, S.F. & Lis, P. & Murshed, S.M. & Zweiri, M., 2020. "What the political economy literature tells us about blockades and sanctions," ISS Working Papers - General Series 130655, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    19. Kirill Chmel & Alexander Demin & Kirill Kazantcev, 2017. "Dictators’ Behavior Under Conditions of Economic Sanctions Cumulative Effect," HSE Working papers WP BRP 50/PS/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    20. Jin Mun Jeong & Dursun Peksen, 2019. "Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 194-217, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jecomi:v:8:y:2019:i:1:p:2-:d:302591. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.