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On the Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis by Using Duration Models

Author

Listed:
  • José Caetano

    (Departamento de Economia and CEFAGE-UE, Universidade de Évora, Largo dos Colegiais, 2, 7000-803 Évora, Portugal)

  • Aurora Galego

    (Departamento de Economia and CEFAGE-UE, Universidade de Évora, Largo dos Colegiais, 2, 7000-803 Évora, Portugal)

  • António Caleiro

    (Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Évora, Largo dos Colegiais, 2, 7000-803 Évora, Portugal)

Abstract

Sanctions are a recurrent issue on the international scene that has gained relevance in recent decades. This article intends to approach this matter in an innovative way by analyzing the relative importance of sanctions’ types and objectives, besides target countries’ characteristics, on sanctions outcomes. Unlike most previous studies, we use more comprehensive data and a competing risk discrete-time hazard model to analyze the differences between sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation. Our results show that the determinants for the two outcomes differ and that there are differences in the efficacy of sanctions according to their type and objective. We conclude that while higher levels of political volatility, democracy, and equality in target countries increase the probability of compliance, higher levels of democracy and globalization increase the probability of sender capitulation. Smart sanctions seem to be more effective at targeting compliance, as the likelihood of compliance is higher for financial and military sanctions than for trade. The likelihood of compliance also increases if the objective is to promote democracy and decreases if the objectives are policy, regime change, or terrorism. Instead, the probability of sender capitulation is higher for travel and trade sanctions and if the objective is to promote human rights.

Suggested Citation

  • José Caetano & Aurora Galego & António Caleiro, 2023. "On the Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis by Using Duration Models," Economies, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-16, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jecomi:v:11:y:2023:i:5:p:136-:d:1138736
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
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    8. Peter A. G. Van Bergeijk & Muhammad S. H. Siddiquee, 2017. "Biased Sanctions? Methodological Change in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered and Its Implications," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(5), pages 879-893, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. L. Savard, 2024. "A Socio−economic Impact Analysis of the Political Crisis in Burundi with a Focus on Children: A Macro–Micro Framework," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 36(4), pages 925-956, August.

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