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On smart sanctions

Author

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  • Beladi, Hamid
  • Oladi, Reza

Abstract

We construct a game theoretic model of an oligarchic economy that potentially could be targeted by smart international sanctions. Oligarchs in this economy provide support for their leader, a strong man and potentially an autocrat, in return for favors that results in having income higher than the average income in the country. We derive the conditions under which smart sanctions lead to compliance by the target country. Moreover, we draw some comparison between the effectiveness of smart and dumb sanctions for these economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Beladi, Hamid & Oladi, Reza, 2015. "On smart sanctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 24-27.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:24-27
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    2. Hamid Beladi & Reza Oladi, 2009. "Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 125-133, February.
    3. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1999. "Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 403-408, May.
    4. Krugman, Paul R., 1979. "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-479, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Ahn, Daniel P. & Ludema, Rodney D., 2020. "The sword and the shield: The economics of targeted sanctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    3. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    4. José Caetano & Aurora Galego & António Caleiro, 2023. "On the Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis by Using Duration Models," Economies, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-16, May.
    5. Nguyen, Trung Thanh & Do, Manh Hung, 2021. "Impact of economic sanctions and counter-sanctions on the Russian Federation’s trade," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 267-278.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Smart sanctions; Economic sanctions; Oligarchic economies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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