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The effects of vertical integration on competing input suppliers

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  • R. Preston McAfee

Abstract

When a downstream firm buys an input supplier, it can reduce its costs of using that input. Other input suppliers typically respond by pricing more aggressively, given the demand reduction, which tends to lower input supply costs to other firms. Thus, a vertical merger may lower rivals' costs instead of raising them.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "The effects of vertical integration on competing input suppliers," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 2-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1999:i:qi:p:2-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
    2. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    3. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    4. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
    2. Brickley, James A. & Linck, James S. & Smith, Clifford W., 2012. "Vertical integration to avoid contracting with potential competitors: Evidence from bankers' banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 113-130.
    3. Arancibia, Rodrigo García & Masaro, Jimena Vicentin & Coronel, Mariano, 2024. "Latin American beer production and import demand for regional malt and malted barley," International Journal on Food System Dynamics, International Center for Management, Communication, and Research, vol. 15(02), June.
    4. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1999. "Banking consolidation and correspondent banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 9-20.
    5. McAndrews, James J. & Strahan, Philip E., 2002. "Deregulation, Correspondent Banking, and the Role of the Federal Reserve," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 320-343, July.
    6. Christopher Garmon, 2004. "Complements Integration and Foreclosure: The Case of Joint Consumption," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(4), pages 893-904, April.
    7. Bhuyan, Sanjib, 2001. "Impact Of Vertical Mergers On Food Industry Profitability: An Empirical Evaluation," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20469, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Pei-Cheng Liao, 2010. "Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(4), pages 263-276.
    9. Rakesh Basant & Pulak Mishra, 2019. "Impact of Vertical Integration on Market Power in Indian Manufacturing Sector During the Post-Reform Period," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 561-581, December.
    10. Kerem Cakirer, 2007. "A Fixed Effect Model of Endogenous Integration Decision and Its Competitive Effects," Working Papers 2007-18, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    11. Pei-Cheng Liao, 2014. "Input Prices as Signals of Costs to a Downstream Rival and Customer," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 414-430, September.

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