IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/jfrcpp/v19y2011i2p139-155.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Co‐operative and competitive enforced self regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Marianne Ojo

Abstract

Purpose - The primary purpose of the paper is to demonstrate how corporate responsibility and accountability could be fostered through monitoring and the involvement of governments in the regulation of firms. Design/methodology/approach - In considering why practices which stimulate incentives for private agents to exert corporate control should be encouraged, this paper highlights criticisms attributed to government control of banks. However, the theory relating to the “helping hand” view of government is advanced as having a fundamental role in the regulation and supervision of banks. Findings - Governments have a vital role to play in corporate responsibility and regulation given the fact that banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being principally attributed to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the ability to supervise banks. Research limitations/implications - Banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being principally attributed to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the ability to supervise banks. Practical implications - The paper illustrates how structures which operate in various systems, namely, stock market economies and universal banking systems, function (and attempt) to address gaps which may arise as a result of lack of adequate mechanisms of accountability. Social implications - The paper also draws attention to the impact of asymmetric information (generally and in these systems), on levels of monitoring procedures and how conflicts of interests which could arise between banks and their shareholders, or between governments and those firms being regulated by the regulator, could be addressed. Originality/value - Through its supervision of banks, governments also assume an important role where matters related to the fostering of accountability are concerned – not only because banks may have the power to affect firm performance, but also because some private agents are not able to afford internal monitoring mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Marianne Ojo, 2011. "Co‐operative and competitive enforced self regulation," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(2), pages 139-155, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:19:y:2011:i:2:p:139-155
    DOI: 10.1108/13581981111123852
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/13581981111123852/full/html?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/13581981111123852/full/pdf?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1108/13581981111123852?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Genschel, Philipp & Plümper, Thomas, 1996. "Wenn Reden Silber und Handeln Gold ist: Kommunikation und Kooperation in der internationalen Bankenregulierung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 96/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Ojo, Marianne, 2010. "The impact of capital and disclosure requirements on risks and risk taking incentives," MPRA Paper 20404, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    4. Roberta Romano, 2005. "Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(2), pages 212-231, Summer.
    5. Genschel, Philipp & Plümper, Thomas, 1997. "Regulatory competition and international cooperation," MPIfG Working Paper 97/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Senderski, Marcin, 2012. "Self-regulation as a remedy for market turmoil: An over-the-counter or a prescription drug?," MPRA Paper 51328, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ojo, Marianne, 2010. "Co-operative and competitive enforced self regulation: the role of governments, private actors and banks in corporate responsibility," MPRA Paper 22918, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Roland Vaubel, 2008. "The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 435-465, December.
    3. Barucci, Emilio & Mattesini, Fabrizio, 2008. "Bank shareholding and lending: Complementarity or substitution? Some evidence from a panel of large Italian firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2237-2247, October.
    4. Magnus Söderberg, 2008. "Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-94, February.
    5. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    6. Michael Beenstock, 2010. "Regulatory Failure in the Subprime Crisis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 147-150, February.
    7. Simshauser, Paul, 2024. "On static vs. dynamic line ratings in renewable energy zones," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    8. Aboudou Maman Tachiwou, 2016. "Corporate Governance and Firms’Financial Performance of Listed Company in the West African Monetary Union (Wamu) Regional Financial Exchange," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(8), pages 212-212, August.
    9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," NBER Working Papers 7319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ojo, Marianne, 2006. "The Role of External Auditors and International Accounting Bodies in Financial Regulation and Supervision," MPRA Paper 354, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2006.
    11. Zhang, Huili & Chan, Kam C., 2018. "Bank shareholding and corporate cash management: Evidence from China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 235-253.
    12. Sophie Harnay, 2023. "Richard A. Posner: From Public Choice Theory to Economic Analysis of Law (1969-1973)," Working Papers AFED 23-02, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    13. Mountain, Bruce R., 2019. "Ownership, regulation, and financial disparity: The case of electricity distribution in Australia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    14. Lehr, William & Sicker, Douglas, 2017. "Communications Act 2021," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169478, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    15. Koke, Jens, 2002. "Determinants of acquisition and failure: evidence from corporate Germany," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 457-484, December.
    16. Limpaphayom, Piman & Rogers, Daniel A. & Yanase, Noriyoshi, 2019. "Bank equity ownership and corporate hedging: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 765-783.
    17. Ann†Kristin Achleitner & André Betzer & Marc Goergen & Bastian Hinterramskogler, 2013. "Private Equity Acquisitions of Continental European Firms: the Impact of Ownership and Control on the Likelihood of Being Taken Private," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 19(1), pages 72-107, January.
    18. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    19. Parker, David, 2001. "Economic Regulation: A Preliminary Literature Review and Summary of Research Questions Arising," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30616, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    20. William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:19:y:2011:i:2:p:139-155. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.