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Pro-social or anti-social, or both? A within- and between-subjects study of social preferences

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  • Zhang, Le
  • Ortmann, Andreas

Abstract

The literature on dictator (D) and joy-of-destruction (JoD) games demonstrates that some people can be nice and some people can be nasty. We study, by way of an experiment with between-subjects and within-subjects features, to what extent social preferences are consistent or context dependent. We find that participants’ giving amount in D games, and the amount they destroy in JoD games, depends on the choice set. While the choice set strongly affects participants’ giving decisions, its effect on participants’ destruction decisions is much weaker. We observe inconsistent choices (giving in D games and destroying in JoD games) for about one in five subjects but also find this mixed-motive preference dramatically reduces when the choice sets of standard D and JoD games are enlarged. Most of our participants are selfish although they also tend to make choices that increase social welfare when given the opportunity. The Machiavellian attitudes we elicited predict the giving amount in D games but not the destruction amount in JoD games.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Le & Ortmann, Andreas, 2016. "Pro-social or anti-social, or both? A within- and between-subjects study of social preferences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 23-32.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:23-32
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.03.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Damian Walczak & Dorota Krupa, 2020. "Exchange Transactions and Socioeconomic Determinants of Solidarity: The Case of Post-Solidarity Poland," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 364-377.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictator game; Joy-of-destruction game; Altruism; Nastiness; Mach-IV test;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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