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My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

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  • Corgnet, Brice
  • Sutan, Angela
  • Veszteg, Róbert F.

Abstract

We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Corgnet, Brice & Sutan, Angela & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2011. "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 347-355, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:40:y:2011:i:4:p:347-355
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
    2. Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2016. "Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 144-165.
    3. Natàlia Cugueró-Escofet & Marion Fortin, 2022. "How Should We Distribute Rewards in Social Sustainable Organizations? Investigating Individual Preferences for Justice Allocation Norms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-23, February.
    4. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2016. "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Monash Economics Working Papers 21-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    5. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2013. "How responsive are people to changes in their bargaining position? Earned bargaining power and the 50–50 norm," EcoMod2013 5855, EcoMod.
    6. Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2022. "Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 169-198.
    7. Xile Yin & Siyu Chen & Dahui Li & Feng Zhang, 2021. "Social norms for fairness and board voting behavior: An experimental investigation," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 110-133, March.
    8. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2018. "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 320-334.

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