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Incentive schemes for bus drivers: The case of the public transit system in Santiago, Chile

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  • Tiznado, Ignacio
  • Galilea, Patricia
  • Delgado, Felipe
  • Niehaus, Markus

Abstract

Although many authors have studied regulatory schemes for bus operators of public transport provision, little attention has been given to incentive schemes for bus drivers in terms of economic incentives and labour conditions. Therefore, there is a need to analyse incentive schemes for bus drivers since the level of service of the bus system is dependent on their behaviour. The main objective of this paper is to analyse the current conditions for bus drivers in Santiago, Chile, find the main drives that influence their behaviour and compare labour conditions between different operators. We focus our study on the case of Transantiago using interviews with 100 drivers working for several bus operators. The results of our survey show that drivers in our sample prefer incentives linked to their operational performance rather than consumer satisfaction; drivers also mention that users of buses treat them poorly and are an important source of working stress; and drivers' working conditions differ dramatically between operators. Preliminary actions are proposed regarding drivers' salary in order to improve operator performance and several measures are proposed to authorities so as to even out conditions between operators, enhance passenger driver relationship and ensure that shifts and rest times are honoured.

Suggested Citation

  • Tiznado, Ignacio & Galilea, Patricia & Delgado, Felipe & Niehaus, Markus, 2014. "Incentive schemes for bus drivers: The case of the public transit system in Santiago, Chile," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-83.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:77-83
    DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.09.034
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaparro, Alejandra & Galilea, Patricia & Muñoz, Juan Carlos & Poblete, Joaquín, 2020. "Application of an incentive for bus drivers to achieve an improvement in the quality of service," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Leif Sörensen & Jan Schlüter, 2021. "How do contract types and incentives influence driver behavior?−An analysis of the Kigali bus network," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-11, December.
    3. Ramírez, Vicente & Galilea, Patricia & Poblete, Joaquín & Silva, Hugo E., 2022. "Team-based incentives in transportation firms: An experiment," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 1-12.
    4. Luna-Cortés, Gonzalo, 2020. "Stress perceived by foreigners that use public transportation in Bogotá (Colombia)," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bus drivers; Incentive schemes; Contracts; Labour conditions; Transantiago; Transportation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General

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