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Special versus general protection and attack of parallel and series components

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  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

Special and general protection and attack of two components in parallel or series are analyzed in a simultaneous move game. The analysis differs from earlier research which assumes multiple protection levels. Each player chooses either two special efforts, one general effort, or one special effort and one general effort. This combines to 16 solutions expressed analytically and illustrated with examples. The defender prefers the parallel system. The attacker prefers the series system. We quantify how higher contest intensities typically cause higher efforts, how players prefer low unit effort costs, and how players fight for valuable assets. One insight is to clarify how a player is situated in one of these 16 solutions when striking a balance between special and general efforts, or eliminating one or two efforts, while facing an adversary also striking such a balance. In a rapidly changing world, realizing how strategies can be adjusted towards specialization versus generalization becomes increasingly important.

Suggested Citation

  • Hausken, Kjell, 2017. "Special versus general protection and attack of parallel and series components," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 239-256.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:165:y:2017:i:c:p:239-256
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2017.03.027
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    Cited by:

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    4. Xiao, Hui & Lin, Chen & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Optimal resource allocation for defending k-out-of-n systems against sequential intentional and unintentional impacts," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    5. Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    6. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Defending a series system with individual protection, overarching protection, and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Li, Qing & Li, Mingchu & Tian, Yuan & Gan, Jianyuan, 2023. "A risk-averse tri-level stochastic model for locating and recovering facilities against attacks in an uncertain environment," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    8. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2023. "How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 493-500.
    9. Schlicher, Loe & Lurkin, Virginie, 2024. "Fighting pickpocketing using a choice-based resource allocation model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 315(2), pages 580-595.
    10. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
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    12. Yan, Xihong & Ren, Xiaorong & Nie, Xiaofeng, 2022. "A budget allocation model for domestic airport network protection," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(PB).

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