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New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation

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  • Mizukami, Hideki
  • Wakayama, Takuma

Abstract

This paper proposes new necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation. Our result says that especially in certain environments including matching environments, restricted monotonicity alone is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation. Our application of the result to a school choice environment demonstrates that secure implementability of the deferred acceptance rule depends on the priority structure of schools over students.

Suggested Citation

  • Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2017. "New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 76-78.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:76-78
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. , & , & ,, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    3. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 2007. "Secure Implementation―Theory and Experiments―," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 58(2), pages 122-135, April.
    4. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2015. "Ex post self-implementation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 357-367, October.
    5. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018. "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-383.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Secure implementation; Nash implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Restricted monotonicity; School choice; The deferred acceptance algorithm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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