An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0151-0
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Cited by:
- Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018. "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-383.
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More about this item
Keywords
Secure implementability; Full implementability in truthful strategies; Strategy-proofness; Pure exchange economy; Leontief utility function; C72; D51; D52; D71; D78;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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