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The winner’s curse in acquisitions of privately-held firms

Author

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  • Brander, James A.
  • Egan, Edward J.

Abstract

The winner’s curse is often associated with acquisitions of publicly-traded firms but not with private acquisitions. Using an event study methodology for over 22,000 private acquisitions of U.S. firms between 1985 and 2015, we examine a possible winner’s curse for such acquisitions. While the average return to private acquisitions is slightly positive, fully 46% of acquirers experience statistically significant negative abnormal announcement returns, strongly suggesting a winner’s curse. We also find that acquirer competition, informational asymmetries, and overconfidence all reduce announcement returns, which is consistent with the winner’s curse. In addition, we carry out a comparative analysis of acquisitions of publicly-traded targets and find a statistically significant negative average return, as is consistent with much previous work. We find that 54% of acquirers of publicly-traded firms obtain statistically significant negative returns, suggesting a stronger winner’s curse for public than for private acquisitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Brander, James A. & Egan, Edward J., 2017. "The winner’s curse in acquisitions of privately-held firms," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 249-262.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:65:y:2017:i:c:p:249-262
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2017.01.010
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Winner’s curse; Acquisition; Private target; Informational asymmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles

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