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Multiperiod Matching

Author

Listed:
  • Sangram V. Kadam
  • Maciej H. Kotowski

Abstract

We examine a dynamic, two‐sided, one‐to‐one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.

Suggested Citation

  • Sangram V. Kadam & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2018. "Multiperiod Matching," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1927-1947, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:4:p:1927-1947
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12324
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    Cited by:

    1. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Itai Ashlagi & Maximilien Burq & Patrick Jaillet & Vahideh Manshadi, 2019. "On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(4), pages 927-949, July.
    3. Marek Pycia & M Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "Matching with Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 948-974.
    4. repec:ris:msuecw:2018_013 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-042, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    6. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Doval, Laura & Schenone, Pablo, 2024. "Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 114-127.
    8. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2021. "Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 474-498.
    9. Shi, Fanqi, 2021. "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 492-502.
    10. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    11. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    12. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    13. repec:ris:msuecw:2019_008 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Morimitsu Kurino, 2020. "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 135-165, January.
    15. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Scott Duke Kominers & Ran I. Shorrer, 2019. "To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories," Papers 1906.10333, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    16. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & MARTINELLO, Alessandro, 2018. "Dynamic refugee matching," Cahiers de recherche 2018-16, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    17. Zakharenko, Roman, 2023. "Pushing towards shared mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    18. Davi B. Costa, 2021. "Benefits of marriage as a search strategy," Papers 2108.04885, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    19. Ramesh Johari & Vijay Kamble & Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Matching While Learning," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 655-681, March.
    20. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    21. Matsui, Akihiko & Murakami, Megumi, 2022. "Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 50-65.
    22. Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2024. "Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 533-553.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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