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Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems

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  • Kimya, Mert

Abstract

We characterize the set of stable matchings when individuals are farsighted and when they choose their objections optimally along a farsighted objection path. We use a solution concept called maximal farsighted set (MFS), which is an adaptation of the concepts developed in Dutta and Vohra (2017) and Dutta and Vartiainen (2020) to one-to-one matching problems. MFS always exists, but it need not be unique. There is a unique largest MFS that contains all other, which is equal to the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994). This implies that the largest consistent set embodies the idea of maximality in one-to-one matching problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimya, Mert, 2022. "Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000898
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105499
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    Cited by:

    1. Imamura, Kenzo & Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu, 2023. "Stability in matching with externalities: Pairs competition and oligopolistic joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 270-286.
    2. Mert Kimya, 2024. "Axiomatic Approach to Farsighted Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2024-03, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    3. Mert Kimya, 2024. "Power, Status and the Stability of Hierarchies," Working Papers 2024-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Farsighted stability; Matching problems; Stable set;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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