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Stable and Extremely Unequal

Author

Listed:
  • Alfred Galichon

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, NYU - NYU System)

  • Octavia Ghelfi

    (NYU - NYU System)

  • Marc Henry

    (Penn State - Pennsylvania State University - Penn State System)

Abstract

We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Galichon & Octavia Ghelfi & Marc Henry, 2021. "Stable and Extremely Unequal," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03936184, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03936184
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03936184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
    2. Ortega, Josué & Ziegler, Gabriel & Arribillaga, R. Pablo, 2024. "Unimprovable Students and Inequality in School Choice," QBS Working Paper Series 2024/05, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    3. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut, 2024. "Rawlsian Matching," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 101-106.
    4. Federico Echenique & Joseph Root & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2024. "Stable matching as transportation," Papers 2402.13378, arXiv.org.
    5. Josue Ortega & Gabriel Ziegler & R. Pablo Arribillaga, 2024. "Unimprovable Students and Inequality in School Choice," Papers 2407.19831, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.

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