The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102515
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Keywords
Contest success function; Optimal entry fee-prize ratio; Endogenous entry; Uncertain number of contestants;All these keywords.
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