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Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games

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  • Hellwig, Martin
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • Reny, Philip J.
  • Robson, Arthur J.

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  • Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:52:y:1990:i:2:p:406-422
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    Cited by:

    1. John Duggan, 2011. "Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria," Wallis Working Papers WP62, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    2. Aviad Heifetz & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2021. "Liberal parentalism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1107-1129, December.
    3. Duggan, John, 2017. "Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 111-126.
    4. He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2020. "Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    5. Guilherme Carmona, 2005. "On Games Of Perfect Information: Equilibria, Ε–Equilibria And Approximation By Simple Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 491-499.
    6. Bensaid, Bernard & Gary-Bobo, Robert J, 1993. "Commitment Value of Contracts under Renegotiation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1423-1429, November.
    7. Hans Reijnierse & Peter Borm & Mark Voorneveld, 2007. "On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 539-560, March.
    8. Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "Two simple proofs of a theorem by Harris," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp486, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    9. Francesco Caruso & Maria Carmela Ceparano & Jacqueline Morgan, 2024. "Asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Stackelberg games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 336(3), pages 1573-1590, May.
    10. Bennett, E. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games," Other publications TiSEM ef13c9a9-3db6-4939-96ef-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Wei He & Yeneng Sun, 2015. "Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information," Papers 1503.08900, arXiv.org.
    12. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2016. "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 5-18.
    13. Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games," Discussion Papers 68, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    14. Kutay Cingiz & János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Perfect information games where each player acts only once," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 965-985, June.
    15. Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Infinite Signaling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 152-173, May.
    16. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, epsilon-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games," Game Theory and Information 0402002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Heifetz, Aviad, 2023. "The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 575-584.
    18. He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2015. "Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information," MPRA Paper 63345, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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