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Oligopoly and overtime

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  • King, Stephen P.

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  • King, Stephen P., 1997. "Oligopoly and overtime," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 149-165, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:4:y:1997:i:2:p:149-165
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Schumann, Paul L, 1982. "Compliance with the Overtime Pay Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 159-181, April.
    2. Szymanski, Stefan, 1994. "Strategic delegation with endogenous costs : A duopoly with wage bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 105-116, March.
    3. repec:bla:econom:v:60:y:1993:i:238:p:183-201 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    5. Trejo, Stephen J, 1991. "The Effects of Overtime Pay Regulation on Worker Compensation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 719-740, September.
    6. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    7. Arrowsmith, J.D., 1988. "Overtime: Legislative and Collective Bargaining Issues," Papers 52, Queen's at Kingston - Sch. of Indus. Relat. Research and Current Issues Series.
    8. Dowrick, Steve & Spencer, Barbara J, 1994. "Union Attitudes to Labor-Saving Innovation: When Are Unions Luddites?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 316-344, April.
    9. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    10. McKenna, Chris, 1983. "Optimal Search for Overtime Work," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 87-95, November.
    11. Ehrenberg, Ronald G, 1970. "Absenteeism and the Overtime Decision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 352-357, June.
    12. Trejo, Stephen J, 1993. "Overtime Pay, Overtime Hours, and Labor Unions," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(2), pages 253-278, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meland, Frode, 2002. "Overtime pay premiums in a unionized oligopoly," Working Papers in Economics 22/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

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