IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed010/795.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Technological Leadership and the Persistence of Monopoly under Endogenous Entry: Static versus Dynamic Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Viatcheslav Vinogradov

    (CERGE-EI, Charles University in Prague)

  • Kresimir Zigic

    (CERGE-EI, Charles University in Prague)

  • Eugen Kovac

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

We build a dynamic oligopoly model in which a particular firm (leader) invests in process innovations facing subsequent endogenous (or free) entry by other firms (followers). All firms that enter the market incur positive entry costs. We identify conditions under which it is optimal for the leader in an initially oligopoly setup with free entry to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment (strategic predation) that eventually leads to the exit of all followers. The novel feature of our approach is that we introduce an explicit dynamic model and compare it with its static counterpart. The dynamic model provides new insights about leader’s intertemporal investment choices and about the dynamics of the market structure. We also contrast the leader’s investment decisions with the decisions of a social planner.

Suggested Citation

  • Viatcheslav Vinogradov & Kresimir Zigic & Eugen Kovac, 2010. "Technological Leadership and the Persistence of Monopoly under Endogenous Entry: Static versus Dynamic Analysis," 2010 Meeting Papers 795, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:795
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2010/paper_795.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
    2. Fabio Ghironi & Marc J. Melitz, 2005. "International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with Heterogeneous Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 865-915.
    3. Marc J. Melitz & Giancarlo I. P. Ottaviano, 2021. "Market Size, Trade, and Productivity," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Firms and Workers in a Globalized World Larger Markets, Tougher Competition, chapter 4, pages 87-108, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Florin O. Bilbiie & Fabio Ghironi & Marc J. Melitz, 2012. "Endogenous Entry, Product Variety, and Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(2), pages 304-345.
    5. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1982. "A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 671-688, May.
    6. John Sutton, 2007. "Market Share Dynamics and the "Persistence of Leadership" Debate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 222-241, March.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    8. Fabio Ghironi & Marc J. Melitz, 2007. "Trade Flow Dynamics with Heterogeneous Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 356-361, May.
    9. Federico Etro, 2006. "Aggressive leaders," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 146-154, March.
    10. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    11. Marc J. Melitz & Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano, 2008. "Market Size, Trade, and Productivity (DOI:10.111/j.1467-937x.2007.00463.x)," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 985-985.
    12. Avinash Dixit, 1979. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 20-32, Spring.
    13. Caputo, Michael R., 1990. "How to do comparative dynamics on the back of an envelope in optimal control theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 655-683, October.
    14. Federico Etro, 2004. "Innovation by leaders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 281-303, April.
    15. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    16. Carlin Wendy & Schaffer Mark & Seabright Paul, 2004. "A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-43, September.
    17. Federico Etro & Andrea Colciago, 2010. "Endogenous Market Structures and the Business Cycle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(549), pages 1201-1233, December.
    18. Rune Stenbacka & Mihkel M. Tombak, 1997. "Commitment and Efficiency in Research Joint Ventures," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Joanna A. Poyago-Theotoky (ed.), Competition, Cooperation, Research and Development, chapter 8, pages 138-158, Palgrave Macmillan.
    19. Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2010. "Welfare‐Reducing Mergers in Differentiated Oligopolies with Free Entry," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(273), pages 178-184, June.
    20. Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
    21. Federico Etro, 2007. "Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-540-49601-4, December.
    22. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-1164, September.
    23. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    24. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    25. Federico Etro, 2006. "Market Leaders and Industrial Policy," Working Papers 103, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006.
    26. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    27. Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & John van Reenen, 1999. "Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(3), pages 529-554.
    28. Creane, Anthony & Konishi, Hideo, 2009. "The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 379-389, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hinloopen, J. & Smrkolj, G. & Wagener, F.O.O., 2013. "In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective," CeNDEF Working Papers 13-05, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    2. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Smrkolj, Grega & Wagener, Florian, 2013. "From mind to market: A global, dynamic analysis of R&D," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2729-2754.
    3. Bondarev, Anton & Dato, Prudence & Krysiak, Frank C., 2021. "Green Technology Transitions with an Endogenous Market Structure," Working papers 2021/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    4. Federico Etro & Michela Cella, 2013. "Equilibrium Principal‐Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 488-512, September.
    5. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.
    6. Susumu Cato & Ryoko Oki, 2012. "Leaders and competitors," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 239-255, November.
    7. Jeroen Hinloopen & Grega Smrkolj & Florian Wagener, 2017. "Research and Development Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 174(2), pages 567-612, August.
    8. Jeroen Hinloopen & Grega Smrkolj & Florian Wagener, 2016. "R&D Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-048/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Kováč, Eugen & Žigić, Krešimir, 2016. "Persistence of monopoly, innovation, and R&D spillovers," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 714-734.
    10. Dirk Czarnitzki & Federico Etro & Kornelius Kraft, 2014. "Endogenous Market Structures and Innovation by Leaders: An Empirical Test," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(321), pages 117-139, January.
    11. Federico Etro, 2014. "Some thoughts on the Sutton approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 99-113, June.
    12. Dawid, Herbert & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2022. "Smart products: Liability, investments in product safety, and the timing of market introduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kresimir Zigic, 2011. "Strategic Interactions in Markets with Innovative Activity: The Cases of Strategic Trade Policy and Market Leadership," CERGE-EI Books, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, edition 1, number b06, May.
    2. Kováč, Eugen & Žigić, Krešimir, 2016. "Persistence of monopoly, innovation, and R&D spillovers," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 714-734.
    3. Federico Etro, 2014. "The Theory Of Endogenous Market Structures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 804-830, December.
    4. Kresimir Zigic & Viatcheslav Vinogradov & Eugen Kovac, 2006. "Persistence of Monopoly, Innovation, and R-and-D Spillovers: Static versus Dynamic Analysis," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 516, Society for Computational Economics.
    5. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    6. Eugen Kovac & Viatcheslav Vinogradov & Kresimir Zigic, 2007. "Persistence of Monopoly, Innovation, and R&D Spillovers: Static versus Dynamic Analysis," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp316, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    8. Federico Etro, 2008. "Stackelberg Competition with Endogenous Entry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1670-1697, October.
    9. Toshihiro Matsumura & Yasunori Okumura, 2014. "Comparison between specific taxation and volume quotas in a free entry Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(2), pages 125-132, October.
    10. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    11. Luís Cabral, 2018. "We’re Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2013-2030, May.
    12. Parenti, Mathieu & Ushchev, Philip & Thisse, Jacques-François, 2017. "Toward a theory of monopolistic competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 86-115.
    13. Federico Etro, 2018. "Macroeconomics with Endogenous Markups and Optimal Taxation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(2), pages 378-406, October.
    14. Federico Etro & Andrea Colciago, 2010. "Endogenous Market Structures and the Business Cycle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(549), pages 1201-1233, December.
    15. Susumu Cato & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2019. "Entry License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(2), pages 258-271.
    16. Federico Etro, 2010. "Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(1), pages 9-45, March.
    17. Zhang, Anming, 2005. "Competition Models of Strategic Alliances," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-100, January.
    18. Inés Macho‐Stadler & Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Technological Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 785-816, December.
    19. Federico Etro, 2006. "Market Leaders and Industrial Policy," Working Papers 103, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006.
    20. Pedro Bento, 2020. "Competition, Innovation, and the Number of Firms," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 275-298, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed010:795. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.