DEA-based fixed cost allocation in two-stage systems: Leader-follower and satisfaction degree bargaining game approaches

This paper proposes new fixed cost allocation approaches for allocating a fixed cost among decision-making units (DMUs) with two-stage structures under the framework of data envelopment analysis (DEA). Firstly, we give the set of possible fixed cost allocations, prove that all DMUs can be overall efficient when evaluated by a common set of weights after fixed cost allocation. Secondly, from a centralized point of view, we consider the competition between the DMUs’ two stages in fixed cost allocation and regard these two kinds of stages as two unions. Then, we incorporate leader-follower models to propose a fixed cost allocation approach to handle the situation in which the two unions make decisions sequentially. Based on the result of these models, a concept of satisfaction degree of each union on a fixed cost allocation is presented. A satisfaction degree bargaining game model is then proposed to obtain a fixed cost allocation which is a bargaining equilibrium of the two unions. We show that the proposed approaches always obtain a fixed cost allocation that is proportionally invariant. Additionally, the satisfaction degree bargaining game approach automatically guarantees the uniqueness of the fixed cost allocation. These properties make the fixed cost allocation generated by our approaches more stable and more acceptable. Finally, a numerical example and an application of fixed cost allocation among bank branches are given to illustrate the proposed approach and to compare it with a benchmark approach among the current studies, respectively.