Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation
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- David Masclet & Marc Willinger, 2005. "Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers halshs-00009661, HAL.
- David Masclet & Marc Willinger, 2005. "Does contributing sequentially increase the level of cooperation in public goods game ? an experimental investigation," Post-Print halshs-00010179, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2010. "Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 691-708, August.
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