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For a dollar, would you…? How (we think) money affects compliance with our requests

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  • Bohns, Vanessa K.
  • Newark, Daniel A.
  • Xu, Amy Z.

Abstract

Research has shown a robust tendency for people to underestimate their ability to get others to comply with their requests. In five studies, we demonstrate that this underestimation-of-compliance effect is reduced when requesters offer money in exchange for compliance. In Studies 1 and 2, participants assigned to a no-incentive or monetary-incentive condition made actual requests of others. In both studies, requesters who offered no incentives underestimated the likelihood that those they approached would grant their requests; however, when requesters offered monetary incentives, this prediction error was mitigated. In Studies 3–5, we present evidence in support of a model to explain the underlying mechanism for this attenuation effect. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that offering monetary incentives activates a money-market frame. In Study 5, we find that this activation reduces the discomfort associated with asking, allowing requesters to more accurately assess the size of their request and, consequently, the likelihood of compliance.

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  • Bohns, Vanessa K. & Newark, Daniel A. & Xu, Amy Z., 2016. "For a dollar, would you…? How (we think) money affects compliance with our requests," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 45-62.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:134:y:2016:i:c:p:45-62
    DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.04.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Hardin, Ashley E. & Bauman, Christopher W. & Mayer, David M., 2020. "Show me the … family: How photos of meaningful relationships reduce unethical behavior at work," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 93-108.
    3. Woolley, Kaitlin & Fishbach, Ayelet, 2018. "Underestimating the importance of expressing intrinsic motivation in job interviews," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 1-11.

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