IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jmacro/v68y2021ics0164070421000239.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Strong, Christine
  • Yayi, Constant

Abstract

Can central bank independence (CBI) help to reduce fiscal balances? In this paper, we answer this question using novel measures of CBI based on the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) and the Garriga measure of legal independence for 30 African countries for the period 1990–2017. Our novel measures of CBI capture the degree of alliance between the fiscal authority and the monetary authority which can potentially lead to debt monetization and higher fiscal balances. Thus, we classify central bank governor changes into ally changes or non-ally changes; in addition to that, we decompose our full sample into CFA zone countries and non-CFA zone countries to capture the effect of currency union membership. Our results show that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy, when proxied by the turnover rate of central bank governors, is associated with a decrease in fiscal balances and replacing a central banker with a non-ally, is negatively and significantly associated with fiscal balances.

Suggested Citation

  • Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant, 2021. "Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0164070421000239
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2021.103313
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0164070421000239
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmacro.2021.103313?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, 2007. "Investor Protection and Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-006/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Jean-Louis Combes & Tahsin Saadi-Sedik, 2006. "How does trade openness influence budget deficits in developing countries?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(8), pages 1401-1416.
    3. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
    4. Clark, William Roberts & Hallerberg, Mark, 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 323-346, June.
    5. Hielscher, Kai & Markwardt, Gunther, 2012. "The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 286-301.
    6. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
    7. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March.
    9. Marcello D'Amato & Barbara Pistoresi & Francesco Salsano, 2009. "On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 107-119.
    10. Xavier Debrun & Paul Masson & Catherine Pattillo, 2005. "Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain, who might lose, and why?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(2), pages 454-481, May.
    11. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    12. Svensson, Jakob & Shi, Min, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 21-36.
    14. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 1988. "Fiscal Policymaking and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 647-662, November.
    15. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, September.
    16. Issouf Samaké & Mr. Nikola Spatafora, 2012. "Commodity Price Shocks and Fiscal Outcomes," IMF Working Papers 2012/112, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Guillermo Vuletin & Ling Zhu, 2011. "Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1185-1215, September.
    18. Mr. Manmohan S. Kumar & Mr. Emanuele Baldacci, 2010. "Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt, and Sovereign Bond Yields," IMF Working Papers 2010/184, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Catao, Luis A.V. & Terrones, Marco E., 2005. "Fiscal deficits and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 529-554, April.
    20. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2008. "Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 778-787, December.
    21. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    22. repec:bla:kyklos:v:41:y:1988:i:4:p:647-62 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Bilin Neyapti, 2003. "Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Roles of Central Bank Independence and Financial Market Development," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(4), pages 458-475, October.
    24. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    25. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    26. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    27. Mr. Tetsuya Konuki & Mr. Mauricio Villafuerte, 2016. "Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy among Sub-Saharan African Countries," IMF Departmental Papers / Policy Papers 2016/009, International Monetary Fund.
    28. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    29. Yannick Lucotte, 2009. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Data Analysis," Post-Print halshs-00447398, HAL.
    30. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
    31. Talvi, Ernesto & Vegh, Carlos A., 2005. "Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 156-190, October.
    32. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 1994. "Indépendance de la banque centrale et politique budgétaire," Working Papers 1994-02, CEPII research center.
    33. Sikken, Bernd Jan & de Haan, Jakob, 1998. "Budget Deficits, Monetization, and Central-Bank Independence in Developing Countries," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 493-511, July.
    34. Cristina Bodea, 2013. "Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 81-107, April.
    35. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1989. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Economies," NBER Working Papers 2919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    36. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    37. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ahmad Bhat Aijaz & Iqbal Khan Javaid & Ahmad Bhat Sajad & Ahmad Parray Waseem, 2023. "Central Bank Independence and its Impact on Fiscal Deficit: Evidence from India," Studia Universitatis „Vasile Goldis” Arad – Economics Series, Sciendo, vol. 33(2), pages 71-94, June.
    2. Abdala, Zédou & Goudoussou, Moumin & Timbi, Sézard, 2024. "Can Financial Development Incur Budget Deficits? An ARDL Cointegration Analysis for Cameroon," African Journal of Economic Review, African Journal of Economic Review, vol. 12(1), March.
    3. Christine Strong, 2024. "What type of central banker dampens the political business cycle? The case of Africa," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2), pages 1920-1946, April.
    4. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant L., 2024. "Do central bankers' characteristics matter for Africa? Ethnic favoritism, fractionalization, and inflation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    5. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant L., 2023. "The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 603-620.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Essiane, Patrick-Nelson Daniel, 2018. "Autonomie des Banques Centrales et Finances Publiques en Afrique subsaharienne [Autonomy of Central Banks and Public Finances in Sub-saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper 100828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant L., 2023. "The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 603-620.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Bodea, Cristina & Hicks, Raymond, 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 35-61, January.
    7. Bodea, Cristina & Higashijima, Masaaki, 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 47-70, January.
    8. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    9. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    10. Nolivos, Roberto Delhy & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2014. "The role of central bank independence on optimal taxation and seigniorage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 440-458.
    11. Abel M. Agoba, 2021. "Minimising the inflationary impact of fiscal deficits in Africa: The role of monetary, financial and political institutions," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 724-740, January.
    12. Cristina Bodea, 2013. "Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 81-107, April.
    13. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
    14. Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2010. "Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1003-1023, October.
    15. Berggren, Niclas & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen, 2014. "Social trust and central-bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 425-439.
    16. Strong, Christine Olivia, 2021. "Political influence, central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    17. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    18. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 2016. "Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint Una Vez Más: New Latin American evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 277-289, June.
    20. Frankel, Jeffrey, 2010. "Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1439-1520, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Central bank governors; Fiscal deficit; Ally; CFA zone;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0164070421000239. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.