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Budget Deficits, Monetization, and Central-Bank Independence in Developing Countries

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  • Sikken, Bernd Jan
  • de Haan, Jakob

Abstract

Using various indicators for central bank independence the authors examine the relationship between central bank independence and government budget deficits. Using a two-stage procedure they also analyze whether central bank independence affects the monetization of deficits. First, the monetization relation in each country is estimated and then the resulting accommodation coefficients are related to central bank independence. The authors conclude that only if the turnover rate of central bank governors or the political vulnerability index is used monetary accommodation of deficits is negatively related to central bank independence. There is no relationship between independence and the level of budget deficits. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Sikken, Bernd Jan & de Haan, Jakob, 1998. "Budget Deficits, Monetization, and Central-Bank Independence in Developing Countries," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 493-511, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:50:y:1998:i:3:p:493-511
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    Cited by:

    1. Pavel Trunin & Kniazev Dmitriy & Satdarov Alexandr, 2010. "Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 133P.
    2. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Ignacio Lozano, 2009. "Budget Deficit, Money Growth and Inflation: Evidence from the Colombian case," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(1), pages 65-95, January-J.
    4. Ani Ter-Mkrtchyan & Aimee L. Franklin, 2020. "Global Financial System Outcomes after 2008: A Longitudinal Comparison," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14, March.
    5. Cristina Bodea, 2013. "Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 81-107, April.
    6. Jude Okechukwu Chukwu, 2013. "Budget Deficits, Money Growth and Price Level in Nigeria," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 25(4), pages 468-477, December.
    7. Andreas Freytag, 2001. "Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
    8. repec:lic:licosd:9601 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Essiane, Patrick-Nelson Daniel, 2018. "Autonomie des Banques Centrales et Finances Publiques en Afrique subsaharienne [Autonomy of Central Banks and Public Finances in Sub-saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper 100828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Tan, Eu Chye, 2006. "Fiscal Deficits, Inflation and Economic Growth in a Successful Open Developing Economy," Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 2(1), pages 1-11.
    11. Haan, Jakob de & Kooi, Willem J., 2000. "Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 643-664, April.
    12. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 2016. "Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint Una Vez Más: New Latin American evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 277-289, June.
    13. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant, 2021. "Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    14. Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina, 2000. "Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes: a Case for Currency Boards?," Working Papers 0006, Banco de España.
    15. de Haan, Jakob & Berger, Helge & van Fraassen, Erik, 2001. "How to reduce inflation: an independent central bank or a currency board? The experience of the Baltic countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 218-243, September.

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