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Financially constrained mortgage servicers

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  • Aiello, Darren J.

Abstract

Financially constrained mortgage servicers destroyed substantial MBS investor value during the financial crisis through their management of delinquent mortgages. Servicers advance to investors monthly payments missed by borrowers. In order to minimize this obligation to extend financing to distressed borrowers, constrained servicers aggressively pursued foreclosures and modifications at the expense of investors, borrowers, and future mortgage performance. When agency frictions between the servicer and the investor are higher, the servicer’s financial constraints matter more. IV regressions suggest that, on average per defaulted loan, servicers’ financial constraints are responsible for 20% of the total investor value reduction during the financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Aiello, Darren J., 2022. "Financially constrained mortgage servicers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 590-610.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:144:y:2022:i:2:p:590-610
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.026
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    Cited by:

    1. Seltzer, Lee, 2024. "Effects of financing constraints on maintenance investments in rent-stabilized apartments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    2. Thiemo Fetzer & Benjamin Guin & Felipe Netto & Farzad Saidi, 2024. "Insurers Monitor Shocks to Collateral: Micro Evidence from Mortgage-Backed Securities," CESifo Working Paper Series 11324, CESifo.
    3. Korgaonkar, Sanket, 2023. "The agency costs of tranching: Evidence from RMBS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    4. Isha Agarwal & Malin Hu & Raluca Roman & Keling Zheng, 2023. "Lending by Servicing: Monetary Policy Transmission Through Shadow Banks," Working Papers 23-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Miftah Zikri & Syed Shams & Afzalur Rashid & Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti, 2024. "Does size matter? Examining the probability of firm emergence from bankruptcy," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 24(4), pages 669-713, December.
    6. Karen Pence, 2022. "Liquidity in the mortgage market: How does the COVID‐19 crisis compare with the global financial crisis?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(6), pages 1405-1424, November.
    7. Kim, You Suk & Lee, Donghoon & Scharlemann, Tess & Vickery, James, 2024. "Intermediation frictions in debt relief: Evidence from CARES Act forbearance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage servicing; Securitization; Real estate; Financial constraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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