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Regime Shift And The Post-Crisis World Of Mortgage Loss Severities

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  • Xudong An
  • Lawrence R. Cordell

Abstract

The average loss rate for conventional mortgages rose from less than 10% pre-crisis to more than 30% during the crisis, reaching and sustaining greater than 40% post-crisis. Using a novel database that contains the components of mortgage losses, we identify a regime shift in loss severities caused by various government interventions and changes in business practices in the servicing industry. This regime shift helps explain the persistently high loss severities post-crisis, even after a strong recovery in the housing market. Our findings have implications for loss modeling, pricing, and, potentially, mortgage credit availability.

Suggested Citation

  • Xudong An & Lawrence R. Cordell, 2017. "Regime Shift And The Post-Crisis World Of Mortgage Loss Severities," Working Papers 17-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:17-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    2. Aiello, Darren J., 2022. "Financially constrained mortgage servicers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 590-610.
    3. Laura Blattner & Scott Nelson, 2021. "How Costly is Noise? Data and Disparities in Consumer Credit," Papers 2105.07554, arXiv.org.
    4. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Hartman-Glaser, Barney, 2019. "Are lemons sold first? Dynamic signaling in the mortgage market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-25.

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    Keywords

    mortgages; housing markets; government intervention;
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