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Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model

Author

Listed:
  • Klijn, F.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Masso, J.

Abstract

In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of themembers can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. Our main result is that under the assumption of strict preferences, the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings coincides with the bargaining set of Zhou (1994) for this context.
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Suggested Citation

  • Klijn, F. & Masso, J., 1999. "Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model," Discussion Paper 1999-114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fecc2417-7dcd-4374-ac18-29a76a165b12
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
    2. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching; (weak) stability; bargaining set;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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