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Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption

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  • Rochet, Jean-Charles

Abstract

The paper extends the Baron and Myerson [Baron, D., Myerson, R.B., 1982. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica 50, 911-930] model of monopoly regulation to bidimensional adverse selection: both the marginal cost and the fixed cost of the monopoly are unknown to the regulator. Like in Araujo and Moreira [Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2000. Adverse section problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Ensaios Economicos 389], the paper provides an explicit solution of a screening model without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption.

Suggested Citation

  • Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 693-700, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:693-700
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    2. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto, 2010. "Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1113-1141, May.
    3. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    4. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    5. Hadley, G. & Kemp, M. C., 1971. "Variational Methods in Economics," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780720436013 edited by Bliss, C. J..
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1770-1805.
    2. Braulio Calagua, 2023. "Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 107-150, December.
    3. Araujo, A. & Moreira, H. & Vieira, S., 2015. "The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 166-184.
    4. Laurence JACQUET & Etienne LEHMANN & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2012. "Signing distortions in optimal tax and other adverse selection problems with random participation," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2012003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    5. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2015. "Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 127-164.
    6. Carlier, Guillaume & Dupuis, Xavier & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Thanassoulis, John, 2024. "A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    7. Ismail Saglam, 2024. "The Bayesian approach to monopoly regulation after 40 years," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 108-136, June.
    8. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2012. "Signing distortions in optimal tax or other adverse selection models with random participation," THEMA Working Papers 2012-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    9. Guillaume Carlier & Xavier Dupuis & Jean-Charles Rochet & John Thanassoulis, 2024. "A General Solution to the Quasi Linear Screening Problem," Post-Print hal-04598698, HAL.

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