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The role of private benefits in information acquisition

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  • Hori, Kazumi

Abstract

In many cases, the cost of hiring an agent to acquire information is lower than the cost for the principal to perform that task. However, because of a difference in preferences between the principal and the agent, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent's expertise. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him to report truthfully. The larger the private benefit, the greater is the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, a private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable.

Suggested Citation

  • Hori, Kazumi, 2008. "The role of private benefits in information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 626-631, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:3-4:p:626-631
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Höring & Helmut Gründl & Sebastian Schlütter, 2016. "Impediments to Communication in Financial Institutions: Implications for the Risk Management Organization," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 41(2), pages 193-224, September.
    2. Shimizu, Takashi, 2013. "Cheap talk with an exit option: The case of discrete action space," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 397-400.
    3. Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017. "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 54-71.
    4. Dirk Höring & Helmut Gründl & Sebastian Schlütter, 2016. "Impediments to Communication in Financial Institutions: Implications for the Risk Management Organization," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 41(2), pages 193-224, September.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Opinions as Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 815-860, October.
    6. Hideshi Itoh & Kimiyuki Morita, 2023. "Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 446-463, January.
    7. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
    8. Saori CHIBA & Kaiwen LEONG, 2018. "Information Aggregation and Countervailing Biases in Organizations," Discussion papers e-18-007, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

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