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Coordination with endogenous groups

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  • Chen, Roy

Abstract

The endogenous choice of groups can have an important effect on coordination behavior, but it is an underexplored area of research. In this study, I examine how endogenous group choice affects coordination in a laboratory setting using the minimum-effort game. Most studies on coordination use randomly assigned groups, with some showing that successful coordination can be achieved if the subjects have some social interaction. This study shows that an alternative strategy to improving coordination behavior and equilibrium play is to allow subjects some choice over their group membership.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Roy, 2017. "Coordination with endogenous groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 177-187.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:177-187
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.010
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    Cited by:

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    2. Mürüvvet Büyükboyaci & Andrea Robbett, 2019. "Team formation with complementary skills," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 713-733, November.
    3. Fischer, Mira & Rilke, Rainer Michael & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2020. "Two field experiments on self-selection, collaboration intensity, and team performance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2020-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Mathieu Lefebvre & Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp, 2022. "Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmen," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 6(S1), pages 93-107, July.
    5. Brütt, Katharina & Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 2020. "Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-31.
    6. Chen, Roy & Gong, Jie, 2018. "Can self selection create high-performing teams?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 20-33.
    7. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Luigi Luini, 2017. "Does Focality Depend on the Mode of Cognition? Experimental Evidence on Pure Coordination Games," Department of Economics University of Siena 771, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    8. Mira Fischer & Rainer Michael Rilke & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, 2023. "When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(4), pages 749-774, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experiment; Endogenous groups; Coordination; Minimum-effort game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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