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Optimal stopping in the NBA: Sequential search and the shot clock

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  • Goldman, Matt
  • Rao, Justin M.

Abstract

We study how experienced agents solve a sequential search problem. In professional basketball teams must shoot within 24s of the start of a “possession.” The decision of when to shoot requires weighing the current shooting opportunity against the continuation value of a possession. At each second of the “shot clock,” optimal play requires that a lineup's reservation shot value equals the continuation value. We empirically test this prediction with a structural stopping model. Most lineups adopt a reservation threshold that matches the continuation value closely. Overall, the lineups we study capture 84% of the gains of a dynamic vs. an optimal fixed threshold. Lineups with more shared playing experience performed better on average. Observed mistakes lean towards “impatience” – the adopted threshold is either in too low or has excess steepness – meanings too many shots are taken early in the possession.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldman, Matt & Rao, Justin M., 2017. "Optimal stopping in the NBA: Sequential search and the shot clock," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 107-124.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:136:y:2017:i:c:p:107-124
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.012
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    Cited by:

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    2. Finigan, Duncan & Mills, Brian M. & Stone, Daniel F., 2020. "Pulling starters," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    3. Michael Allgrunn & Christopher Douglas & Sebastian Wai, 2024. "Optimal Timeout Choices in Clutch Situations in the NBA," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 25(2), pages 217-230, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal stopping; Expertise; Lab vs. field; Behavioral biases; Marginal thinking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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