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Endogenous legal traditions

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  • Guerriero, Carmine

Abstract

A key feature of a legal system is the set of institutions used to aggregate the citizens’ preferences over the harshness of punishment, i.e., the legal tradition. While under common law appellate judges’ biases offset one another at the cost of volatility of the law, under civil law the legislator chooses a certain legal rule that is biased only when he favors special interests, i.e., when preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous and/or the political process is sufficiently inefficient. Hence, common law can be selected only under this last scenario. This prediction is consistent with a novel dataset on the lawmaking and adjudication institutions in place at independence and in 2000 in 155 transplants, many of which reformed the transplanted legal tradition.

Suggested Citation

  • Guerriero, Carmine, 2016. "Endogenous legal traditions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 49-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:46:y:2016:i:c:p:49-69
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2016.02.001
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    Cited by:

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    2. Toke S. Aidt & Vitor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2018. "Shades of red and blue: government ideology and sustainable development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 303-323, June.
    3. Theo S. Eicher & David J. Kuenzel, 2019. "European influence and economic development," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(2), pages 667-734, May.
    4. Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2019. "Toward understanding 17th century English culture: A structural topic model of Francis Bacon's ideas," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 111-135.
    5. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro, 2020. "Legal efficiency and consistency," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    6. Mutarindwa, Samuel & Schäfer, Dorothea & Stephan, Andreas, 2021. "Differences in African banking systems: causes and consequences," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 561-581, August.
    7. David Castillo-Merino & Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pérez, 2021. "The Effects of Legal Origin and Corporate Governance on Financial Firms’ Sustainability Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(15), pages 1-20, July.
    8. Mutarindwa, Samuel & Schäfer, Dorothea & Stephan, Andreas, 2020. "Legal History, Institutions and Banking System Development in Africa," GLO Discussion Paper Series 444, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    9. Park, SeHyun, 2022. "Liquid asset sheltering, or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    10. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier, 2014. "Legal convergence and endogenous preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 20-27.
    11. Benati, Giacomo & Guerriero, Carmine & Zaina, Federico, 2022. "The origins of political institutions and property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 946-968.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal origins; Culture; Political institutions; Economic development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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