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Bankruptcy law, asset substitution problem, and creditor conflicts

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  • Bigus, Jochen

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  • Bigus, Jochen, 2002. "Bankruptcy law, asset substitution problem, and creditor conflicts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 109-132, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:2:p:109-132
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    1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, Restructuring, pages 215-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    3. Berkovitch, Elazar & Israel, Ronen & Zender, Jaime F., 1998. "The Design of Bankruptcy Law: A Case for Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 441-464, December.
    4. Berkovitch, Elazar & Israel, Ronen, 1999. "Optimal Bankruptcy Laws across Different Economic Systems," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 347-377.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1998. "Chapter 11," NBER Working Papers 6473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Robert C. Merton, 2005. "Theory of rational option pricing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Sudipto Bhattacharya & George M Constantinides (ed.), Theory Of Valuation, chapter 8, pages 229-288, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Frierman, Michael & Viswanath, P V, 1994. "Agency Problems of Debt, Convertible Securities, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 455-476, October.
    8. Adler, Barry E, 1993. "An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 73-98, January.
    9. Bhattacharyya, Sugato & Singh, Rajdeep, 1999. "The resolution of bankruptcy by auction: allocating the residual right of design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 269-294, December.
    10. White, Michelle J, 1994. "Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 268-295, October.
    11. Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34, June.
    12. Schwartz, Alan, 1997. "Contracting about Bankruptcy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 127-146, April.
    13. Gertner, Robert & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1189-1222, September.
    14. Bigus Jochen, 2000. "Finanzierung über Asset Backed Securities - Ansatzpunkte für eine finanzierungs- theoretische Analyse," Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (ZBB) / Journal of Banking Law and Banking (JBB), RWS Verlag, vol. 12(1), pages 33-44, February.
    15. Black, Fischer & Cox, John C, 1976. "Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 351-367, May.
    16. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    17. Betker, Brian L, 1995. "Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 161-183, April.
    18. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    19. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-585, June.
    20. repec:cep:stitep:/1992/250 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    22. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    23. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, Spring.
    24. Michelle J. White, 1980. "Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 550-564, Autumn.
    25. Drukarczyk, Jochen, 1991. "Secured debt, bankruptcy, and the creditors' bargain model," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 203-221, September.
    26. Stulz, ReneM. & Johnson, Herb, 1985. "An analysis of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 501-521, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jochen Bigus & Thomas Eger, 2004. "Insolvenzrecht zwischen privatautonomer Gestaltung und öffentlicher Regulierung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 193-209, May.
    2. Pindado, Julio & Rodrigues, Luis & de la Torre, Chabela, 2008. "How do insolvency codes affect a firm's investment?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 227-238, December.
    3. de Jong, A., 2004. "It Takes Two To Tango: an empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-049-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    4. Annabi, Amira & Breton, Michèle & François, Pascal, 2021. "Could Chapter 11 redeem itself? Wealth and welfare effects of the redemption option," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Couwenberg, Oscar & Lubben, Stephen J., 2013. "Solving creditor problems in the twilight zone: Superfluous law and inadequate private solutions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 61-76.
    6. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2016. "Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 263-282.
    7. de La Bruslerie, Hubert & Gueguen, Simon, 2021. "Creditors’ holdup, releveraging and the setting of private appropriation in a control contract between shareholders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Couwenberg, Oscar & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "It takes two to tango: An empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-454, December.

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